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Case No. 20060189 
WADE MAUGHAN, : 
Defendant/Petitioner. ; 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The central issue to be decided by this court is whether there is conflict of 
interest that merits the disqualification of defense lawyers in a death penalty case. 
Mr. Maughan and his lawyers contend that there is no conflict and therefore no 
basis to support disqualification. According to the trial court, there is an 
unarticulated "potential conflict" involving the examination of one witness, Randy 
Wager. Unarticulated, because the trial court declined to articulate how that 
conflict might manifest itself. The court made no factual findings and did not hold 
an evidentiary hearing. 
Apparently, the court's ruling is that witness Wager was allegedly told not 
to speak with police. Wager, however, spoke to the police several times after 
contacting them on his own initiative. Wager spoke to police on at least two 
occasions and answered questions about Wade Maughan. There were times where 
2 
he told police he did not want to speak with them for a variety of reasons such as 
prior police harassment, police being against Mr. Maughan, and discussions with 
defense team members about not talking about the case in general. How this 
creates a conflict meriting disqualification is unclear. More importantly, in it's 
conclusions, the court did not discuss how this creates a conflict. 
The state, in its brief, makes three assertions in support of disqualification: 
1. Scott Williams and Richard Mauro made overt admissions that they placed their 
interests over the interests of Wade Maughan; 2. Criminal defense lawyers are 
always subject to disqualification whenever they are present during interviews 
with witnesses and the witnesses later make inconsistent statements; and 3. 
Lawyers for poor people have a less important relationship than lawyers for the 
affluent and therefore can be disqualified more easily. 
As will be discussed below, Mr. Maughan contends that neither Mr. 
Williams nor Mr. Mauro ever admitted or implied putting their interests over Mr. 
Maughan's. Moreover, there is no conflict of interest. The last two assertions are 
simply not supported by existing law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
A. Motions to Disqualify Should be Viewed with Caution 
3 
The state proceeds with the notion that there is a valid conflict of interest in this 
case. 
Nowhere in its brief, however, does it address the well-established principle 
that motions to disqualify should be viewed with caution. See Weaver v. Millard, 
120 Idaho 692, 819 P.2d 110 (Idaho App. 1991) (motions to disqualify opposing 
counsel "should be viewed with caution" as such motions "can be misused as a 
technique for harassment."); Gomez v. Superior Court in and for Pinal County, 
111 P.2d 902, 905 (Ariz. 1986) (court "views with suspicion motions by opposing 
counsel to disqualify a party's attorney based on conflict of interest or appearance 
of impropriety."); Lorin v. 501 Second St., LLC, 2 Misc.3d 646, 769 N.Y.S.2d 361, 
364 (N.Y.Civ. Ct. 2003)("Disqualification motions are carefully scrutinized 
because they seek to deny a party's right to representation by an attorney of his or 
her choice and thereby limit a valued right to the party"); Alexander v. Superior 
Court, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. 1984)("only in extreme circumstances should a 
party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney client relationship of his 
opponent"); State v. Madrid, 468 P.2d 561, 562 (Ariz. 1970)("For the prosecution 
to participate in the selection or rejection of opposing counsel is unseemly if for no 
other reason than the distasteful impression which could be conveyed.") 
Naturally, such motions can be utilized improperly to remove aggressive and 
effective advocates. This case illustrates the impropriety of improper prosecution 
tactics used to argue for disqualification. 
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The state first argues that defense counsel instructed witnesses not to speak 
with police. The witnesses deny that such statements were made. The witnesses 
nonetheless spoke with police. The state then argues that Mr. Mauro pretended to 
be a television reporter and that Scott Williams might have been a getaway car 
driver in an attempt to interview a witness. The state alleged the pair committed 
second degree felony communications fraud. The defense, however, proved that 
claim to be absolutely false. The state even claimed that David Finlayson, a 
lawyer sharing office space with Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams, likely committed 
the criminal offense of witness tampering in Spokane, Washington, when Mr. 
Finlayson has never been to Spokane and has no involvement in this case. There 
have been additional claims of misconduct asserted against lawyers representing 
witnesses in Spokane and assertions that lawyers in Utah acted improperly because 
witnesses in Spokane retained attorneys. The state has even accused the defense 
mitigation specialist of the criminal offense of notary fraud and sought to interfere 
with the contract process so that payment to defense counsel would be delayed or 
denied. 
These claims should be viewed with caution as the vast majority are inaccurate 
and made with reckless disregard for the truth. The nature and number of claims 
suggests a pattern of personal harassment against the defense team members in an 
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effort to "pin some offense on" them to support disqualification..1 See Monroe H. 
Freedman, Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary System, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
Inc., at 81 quoting Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Second Annual 
Conference of U.S. Attorneys (1940)(describing the dangers of prosecutors 
"pick[ing] people he thinks he should get rather than pick[ing] cases that need to 
be prosecuted"). 
B. There is no Conflict of Interest 
The state goes to great lengths to speak about the discretion trial courts have 
in disqualifying counsel. But that decision should be based on articulable facts 
that this court can review and scrutinize. Here, there are no articulable facts. The 
court merely notes that an arrest of defense counsel appears unprecedented.2 It 
then suggests that the arrest has "created a firestorm of controversy" again 
ignoring the fact that such controversy might be based on government misconduct. 
The court then muses that there is a "continuing possibility of prosecution of 
defense counsel in the state of Washington . . . ," again, without stating any basis 
1
 Recently, Durham, North Carolina District Attorney Michael Nifong was 
disbarred for making inaccurate public statements about a rape case in his district. 
See The North Carolina State Bar v. Michael Nifong, Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline, Case No. 06DHC35. Mr. Maughan 
contends that much of the information presented in public pleadings here is similar 
to inaccurate public comments made by Nifong in North Carolina. 
2
 The court fails to state any reference or authority as to why or how it 
concludes the arrest is unprecedented, nor did it consider, as asserted by Mr. 
Maughan, that it was done for an improper purpose. 
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for that proposition.3 The court then leaps to the conclusion that Utah Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 3.4 might have been violated without stating how or in 
what manner. Apparently, the lynchpin of the court's argument for 
disqualification revolves around the conclusion that "[t]here is a potential conflict 
that examination of Mr. Wagar at trial might raise issues which implicate either 
Mr. Mauro or Mr. Williams to the defendant's detriment. . . ," once more without 
explaining, articulating, or identifying what those "detriments" might be.4 
The court's subjective conclusion that the arrest was unprecedented and the 
resulting "firestorm" do not create a conflict.5 Although the court does not state 
how Mr. Wagar's testimony might implicate defense counsel, the state suggests 
that anything Wagar might say inconsistent with what he allegedly told police 
would make Mr. Mauro, Mr. Williams, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Cilwick potential 
3
 No criminal charges have been filed in Spokane, Washington and the 
matter is now nearly two years old. 
4
 The state contends that it is "entitled to explore Wagar's biases . . . , [at 
which point] the events concerning the witness tampering allegations will become 
relevant." It is equally relevant to explore the biases of the police to suggest that 
they lied, that they bullied and threatened witnesses, and that they arrested 
members of the defense team as a means of preventing access to the witnesses. 
Mr. Maughan has filed a second motion for interlocutory appeal claiming that the 
alleged confession was coerced and that any order compelling Mr. Maughan to 
testify in the trial of the co-defendant should be stayed. Utah Supreme Court Case 
No. 10061166. Once that motion is heard in the trial court, police credibility will 
certainly be critical to that claim.. 
5
 If an arrest and resulting "firestorm" creates a conflict, police would have 
the incentive to arrest defense counsel in every case when confronted by 
competent and aggressive opponents. 
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witnesses. The way trials work in Utah and elsewhere in the United States is that 
witnesses testify. Those witnesses are then subject to cross-examination. Neither 
side "owns" witnesses and oftentimes one or both sides will seek to interview 
witnesses before trial. Frequently, those witnesses make inconsistent statements.6 
If the witness makes an inconsistent statement, then an independent witness, for 
example a police officer or defense investigator, can testify and explain the prior 
inconsistency. Rules of evidence everywhere in this country contemplate this very 
scenario. 
If this Court concludes that the presence of a lawyer at an interview is 
grounds for disqualification, then neither prosecutors nor defense lawyers could 
ever be present for interviews with trial witnesses. That is not the state of the law 
in this country. See Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 224 (Tex. Crim. 
1989)("If merely talking with a witness produces a disqualification because there 
is a mere possibility that claims of misconduct could be made, then all 
investigators, prosecutors, and defense lawyers will invariably be subject to being 
removed. That simply and understandably is not the law."). 
6
 As suggested by the state, there are all sorts of reasons that witnesses 
make inconsistent statements. The state claims that the sole reason Mr. Wagar 
made inconsistent statements is because he has bias in favor of Wade Maughan. 
The state's one-sided view of the evidence does not justify disqualification. There 
are, of course, a number of additional reasons Mr. Wagar may have made 
inconsistent statements, e.g., memory problems, and police coercion and lies. Of 
course, Mr. Maughan contends that Mr. Wagar never told police he was told not to 
talk to them and any suggestion otherwise was fabricated by police. 
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II. NEITHER SCOTT WILLIAMS NOR RICHARD MAURO 
ADMITTED NOR IMPLIED THAT THEY PLACED THEIR 
INTERESTS ABOVE THOSE OF WADE MAUGHAN THUS 
ACKNOWLEDGING A CONFLICT OF INTERTEST. 
In its brief, the state contends that Scott Williams "admitted to an actual Sixth 
Amendment conflict of interest." State's Brief, at 29. They base this assertion on 
a letter Mr. Williams sent to the prosecutors regarding production of discovery in 
Mr. Maughan's case. A simple review of the letter, however, reveals no such 
admission. On December 15, 2005, Mr. Williams wrote a letter to the prosecutors 
referencing three things. First, he notes that any claims of wrongdoing in Spokane 
were unfounded. Second, he expressed concerns about the prosecutor's direct 
interference in the contract process with the defense team chiefly because the 
prosecutors were not parties to the contract and defense had incurred significant 
costs in Mr. Maughan's defense.7 Third, Mr. Williams requested the state 
immediately provide discovery relating to Mr. Maughan's case and that in light of 
the Spokane events any cooperative efforts to share costs had ended. A passing 
reference that events in Spokane have "wholly occupied our time" is accurate as 
the defense team then, as now, contends the allegations and claims of wrongdoing 
were unfounded. 
Similarly, Mr. Mauro made no admission that he had placed his interests above 
Mr. Maughan's. Again, the state mischaracterizes a letter sent to the prosecutors 
7
 The prosecution's interference with the funding mechanism has an 
obvious chilling effect on counsels' ability to provide effective representation. 
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regarding the arrests in Spokane. On December 27, 2005, Mark Moffat, an 
attorney representing Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick, sent a letter to the prosecutors 
regarding the arrests in Spokane. That letter was sent specifically to inform the 
prosecutors that police actions up to that point have "substantially interfered with 
Mr. Mauro's and Mr. Williams' efforts to represent Mr. Maughan." (emphasis 
added). Mr. Moffat was clear that an extensive investigation proved no 
wrongdoing on the part of the defense team and that continued efforts to 
undermine the defense effort would hurt both the defense team personally and Mr. 
Maughan: 
It is my sincere desire before additional action is taken that due 
consideration be given to the issues identified above and the 
significant ramifications to the constitutional rights of my clients and 
Mr. Maughan. TR, 135 
No reasonable reading of these letters would lead to the conclusion that Mr. 
Williams, Mr. Mauro, or any member of the defense team placed their interests 
above that of Wade Maughan. The state mistakenly equates the natural objections 
to the government's misconduct as a basis to state that the defense team placed 
their interests above Wade Maughan's. In fact, the record shows the opposite. 
The defense team has and continues to make significant efforts to represent Mr. 
Maughan by interviewing witnesses, requesting discovery and conducting 
mitigation.8 
8
 Mr. Maughan even filed a petition for extraordinary relief to fund Mr. 
Maughan's defense as the trial judge has denied all orders for payment. See Wade 
10 
The problem with the state's argument is that once police or prosecutors claim 
misconduct then the defense team should automatically be disqualified - even if 
the allegations are false or made in an attempt to orchestrate disqualification. If 
Mr. Maughan did not challenge the accuracy of the state's claim, then the state 
would argue for disqualification. Once the defense challenges the accuracy and 
truthfulness of the claims, then on the state's theory, they are still subject to 
disqualification because they are placing their interests before the client's. The 
state's argument on this point lacks merit because it creates an untenable Hobson's 
choice. An objection to the allegations results in disqualification because counsel 
then places their interests above the client's. No objection to the allegations results 
in disqualification because the allegations are deemed true. Here, there is no 
admission of wrongdoing by defense counsel and no basis to support 
disqualification. 
III. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT POOR PEOPLE HAVE A 
MORE LIMITED RELATIONSHIP WITH AN APPOINTED 
LAWYER THAN AN AFFLUENT PERSON AND THEREFORE 
THAT THEIR LAWYER IS MORE EASILY DISQUALIFIED 
WOULD SET BAD PRECEDENT 
In its brief the state argues that the "Sixth Amendment right to 
representation by chosen counsel applies only to non-indigent defendants." State's 
Maughan v. Ben H. Hadfield, Supreme Court Case No. 20061110. The state 
threatened to file criminal charges against the mitigation specialist who, despite 
not being paid, continued to work on Mr. Maughan's behalf by requesting records 
and preparing the mitigation workup through March of 2006. 
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Brief, at 16. In the cases cited by the state, the courts state the obvious premise: 
"[a] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford." 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). That statement is made in the 
context of accused indigent persons who request representation by a particular 
lawyer. Understandably, courts cannot appoint requested lawyers, but rather refer 
those persons to public defender offices or appointed panel lawyers. The best 
example in Salt Lake County is the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, the 
agency to which indigent defendants are referred. Once that office is appointed, 
then the accused logically has no right to a particular attorney, but a lawyer is 
appointed presumably as part of a rotation process. 
The cases do not stand for the proposition that indigent persons should have 
a less meaningful relationship with their lawyer than an affluent person. That 
would create a two-tier system of justice: one for the rich and one for the poor. 
That is a concept that the United States Supreme Court has fought very hard to 
avoid. See Gideon v. Wainwright, ill U.S. 335 (1963). The cases cited by the 
state are attempting to communicate that indigent persons must accept the lawyer 
appointed to them, not that an appointed lawyer is more easily disqualified or has a 
lesser attorney client relationship because the person is poor. Justice Brennan in 
his concurrence in Morris v. Slappy, discussed this concept: 
This ground of distinction, however, is not sufficient to preclude 
recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation 
by a particular lawyer who has been appointed to represent him and with 
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whom the defendant has developed a relationship. Nothing about indigent 
defendants makes their relationships with their attorneys less important, or 
less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy defendants . . . . There 
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has. . . . [W]here an indigent defendant wants to 
preserve a relationship he has developed with counsel already appointed by 
the court, I can perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least to 
consider this interest in determining whether continued representation is 
possible. 
461 U.S. 1. 22-23 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring). 
A suggestion that the state or court have the authority or power to more 
easily remove or disqualify appointed counsel would appear inconsistent with the 
spirit and intent of the United States Supreme Court and its recognition of the 
importance of appointed counsel in serious felony cases. If this court were to 
conclude that it is somehow easier to disqualify appointed counsel merely because 
the defendant is indigent, it would seriously undermine the legitimate and effective 
efforts of appointed counsel in these cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Maughan requests that this court reverse the order of the trial court and 
reinstate Mr. Williams as Mr. Maughan's lawyer. 
DATED this \U day of August, 2007. 
RfCHARDRMAURO 
Attorney for Petitioner Wade Maughan 
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